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FOA 
 
THE IMPACT OF THE EUROPEAN UNION CURRENT CRISIS ON LAW, POLICY AND SOCIETY* 
 
CELS Seminar, Cambridge, October 16, 2013 
 
Abstract: The purpose and methodology of this article is as follows: first, to understand the general nature of the current crisis (banking, 
financial, debt, currency, constitutional, political) from a socio%legal, economic, ideological and political perspective; then, to analyse the 
complexity of the multiple causes which have led to the current crisis in particular areas of law (financial, banking, securities, contract, 
competition and corporate law) in which it has manifested itself and the sectors of the economy it has affected;  and, finally, to criticise law in 
action and the management of the crisis through political decision%making (state intrusiveness), that is, the various responses and reactions to the 
crisis and the effectiveness of the measures implemented by policy%makers and enforcers, and, inter alia, to question the constitutional legitimacy 
of the TBTF (Too%Big%to%Fail) theory as a predominant doctrine and criterion of state intervention in the economy.  
A multi%layered level of economic, social, and political governance is envisaged through insights from microeconomics, by looking at how 
economic agents have affected individuals such as consumers; from macroeconomics, by looking at how state intervention in the economy has 
impacted upon taxpayers and the human and social costs of the crisis; and from political economy by looking through the lenses of ideology and 
policy and reflecting on the role of neoliberalism today. 
To conclude, the heavy reliance on the TBTF doctrine became a European ‘Too Big to Crash’ test which signals past memories and fears of an 
eventual repeat of the 1929 Wall Street crash, which to date has been avoided by all possible methods of political intervention. Unfortunately, 
competition law could be seen as the scapegoat of this unprecedented restructuring of the banking and financial markets through competition 
policy’s illegitimate and undeserved but generous state aid to benefit mostly inefficient and unscrupulous financial game players. This last 
recognition leads us to question the adequate measures of profit%seeking capitalism. 
 
I. ON THE NATURE AND HISTORY OF THE CRISIS 
 
The nature of the current crisis has been determined by the sectors of the economy which are most affected by 
economic failures. On the basis of this starting criterion, large financial institutions, such as commercial, investment 
or securities banks and other major corporations, involved in financial service transactions have experienced a large 
number of defaults; this has been recognised as a banking crisis.1 However, a greater risk to affect and spread the 
banking crisis to other financial institutions has made it systemic. Before the crisis, banks experienced longer periods of 
credit expansion, which had also led to a rise of asset prices (real estate, equity), above the level of economic growth, 
namely, the gross domestic product (GDP). On the negative side, the credit boom reached a peak and burst into a 
price ‘bubble’, i.e. house prices fell below outstanding balances on home mortgages. Thus, a sovereign debt crisis then 
emerged as defaults on payments of debt obligations became the rule which called for the restructuring of the banking 
sector. This process meant offering debtors less favourable terms than the expected capital gains.  
The global crisis emerged first in the US subprime market,2 which generated losses during summer 2007 to mid6
2008. Hundreds of billions of dollars in bad mortgage loans initially set at bargain rates3 were then reset at market 
rates so that when housing prices started to fall, owners defaulted on their payments. This was followed by the 
                                                          
* Dr Anca D Chirita, lecturer in law and co6director Durham European Law Institute, Durham Law School, United Kingdom (email 
a.d.chirita@durham.ac.uk). This article is based on previous research6led presentations to LLM and undergraduate students taking competition 
law, including a Pre6sessional Lecture on ‘Competition, Financial Markets and the Economic Crisis’ delivered on September 11, 2013 at 
Josephine Butler College, Durham, England. I would like to thank my colleague, Dr Folarin Akinbami, for extremely helpful comments and 
insightful discussions. 
1 CM Reinhart and KS Rogoff, This Time is Different: Eight Centuries of Financial Folly (Princeton University Press, 2009); J de Haan, S Oosterloo 
and D Schoenmaker, Financial Markets and Institutions: A European Perspective (2nd ed, Cambridge, CUP, 2012); S Valdez and P Molyneux, An 
Introduction to Global Financial Markets (7th ed, Palgrave Macmillian, 2013). Economists predict an economic downturn where output falls by 9% 
over two years; unemployment rises up to 7% over 4 years; and government debt increase by 86% over the next 3 years following a systemic 
banking crisis. 
2 See M Jarsulic, ‘The Origins of the US Financial Crisis of 2007: How a House6Price Bubble, a Credit Bubble, and Regulatory Failure Caused 
the Greatest Economic Disaster since the Great Depression’ in MH Wolfson and GA Epstein (eds) The Handbook of the Political Economy of 
Financial Crisis (Oxford, OUP, 2013) 30. 
3 Interest rates were very low due to large capital flows from abroad to the US economy, the Federal Reserve, and low inflation. 
  Durham Law School                                     Draft article forthcoming vol 16 CYELS                     Anca D Chirita   
                
2 
 
bailout of Bear Stearns, the US’s fifth largest investment bank; the nationalisation of mortgage agencies, Fannie Mae 
and Freddie Mac; and Lehman Brothers’ bankruptcy in September 2008. Until late October of that year, a global loss 
of confidence created a systemic risk of collapse. The recession manifested itself through sharp increases in budget 
deficits and slow economic recovery. In addition, tax revenues plummeted and the limits of the Stability and Growth 
Pact of 19974 were breached. After September 2008, European Union (EU) rescue policies focused on restoring the 
liquidity of banks and guarantees, while the ECB (European Central Bank) and national central banks, outside the 
euro, adjusted the provision of liquidity and cut interest rates.5 The European Recovery Plan provided a discretionary 
fiscal stimulus of €200 bn, of which €170 bn was used for budgetary expansion and the rest to ‘boost demand and 
stimulate confidence’.6 A European Financial Stabilisation Mechanism provided Member States with another €500 
billion. Until March 2009, investors’ focus was on the global economic downturn. Not until mid6March 2009, were 
there any signs of stabilisation.7 
Unique due to its geo6political architecture, the European crisis revealed that it is not solely economic actors who 
can default on their contractual obligations; Member States, such as Greece, can also fail to keep up with their 
borrowing costs. Furthermore, political pursuits of monetary union and its single currency highlight its complexity, 
as pictured above at the micro6economic level. At the macro6economic level, states which maintain fixed exchange 
rates may also experience a currency crisis where the value of the national currency falls suddenly as a result of a loss of 
confidence followed by speculative attacks.8 When the ECB launched the single currency, only 12 Member States 
joined the Eurozone, followed five years later by another five Member States.9 
The Greek tragedy has led the EU to reconsider both the political and the constitutional dimension of the sovereign 
debts crisis. In May 2010, the Union set a precedent by granting a total of €80 bn to Greece.10 In this context, the 
solidarity with a Member State’s economic failure triggered a political crisis fuelled with heated legal arguments. In 
particular, solidarity is pre6empted by Article 125 (1) TFEU itself, which rules out state bailouts11 when it says that 
both the Union and its Member States shall not be liable for or assume commitments of central governments.12 It 
became known that Greece had manipulated its data for accession to the single currency,13 which then called for an 
evaluation of its debts and rescue package. A constitutional crisis emerged which suggested Greece’s possible exit from 
the Eurozone. The precarious situation of sovereign debts transformed this crisis into a Euro currency crisis amid 
speculations over Greece’s economy. This has been the first major test of both economic and, foremost, social 
European integration, which has revealed the perils of free capital markets, liberalisation, and a single currency based 
on institutional foundations which were not capable of sharing the economic costs of major economic imbalances. For 
instance, in May 2011, Portugal received a €78 bn rescue package from the EU and the IMF.14 
In the absence of a fiscal union, the Founding Treaties proposed an Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) subject 
to strict convergence criteria. Thus, the crisis has highlighted the existing economic disparities in terms of economic 
development across the EU. Being part of a ‘Union of benefits’ has made Member States economically and socially 
responsible for another Member State’s inefficiency; in the same way, the financialization of capital services 
worldwide has triggered the responsibility of various economic actors, states, institutions, and the wider society. It 
                                                          
4 See R Guttman and D Plihon, ‘Whither the Euro? History and Crisis of Europe’s Single6Currency Project’ in Handbook (2013) 368. The SGP 
imposed uniform limits for budget deficits and public6debt level. 
5 C Quigley, ‘Review of the Temporary State Aid Rules Adopted in the Context of the Financial and Economic Crisis’ 3 J of Comp Law & 
Practice 3 (2012) 237. On state aid generally see C Quigley and AM Collins, EC State Aid Law and Policy (Oxford, Hart Publ, 2003). 
6 Ibid. 
7
 Positive signs are noted in ‘Towards a Genuine Economic and Monetary Union’, available at 
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/134069.pdf. 
8 For example, in 1999, several EU Member States attempted to stabilise their exchange rates through the Exchange Rate Mechanism. 
9 See P Arestis and M Sawyer, ‘Can the Euro Survive after the European Crisis?’ in The Euro Crisis Arestis and Sawyer (Eds) Palgrave Macmillian 
2012. In 1999, Denmark, Sweden and the UK decided to remain outside the Eurozone. 
10 E Chiti and PG Teixeira, ‘The Constitutional Implications of the European Responses to the Financial and Public Debt Crisis’ 50 CMLR 
(2013) 686; Guttman and Plihon, 372 mention a total of €750 bn, including the IMF granted to Greece.  
11 M Ruffert, ‘The European Debt Crisis and European Union Law’ 48 CMLR (2011) 1785. 
12  The only exception in Art 125 (1) is ‘without prejudice to mutual financial guarantees for the joint execution of a specific project’.  
13 See e.g. http://euobserver.com/economic/28871. 
14 Guttman and Plihon 372. 
  Durham Law School                                     Draft article forthcoming vol 16 CYELS                     Anca D Chirita   
                
3 
 
has raised the question of who is primarily responsible for the crisis. This is not easy to answer either before or after 
judging the roots of the crisis. 
 
II. ON THE ROOTS OF THE CRISIS: WHAT WENT WRONG?  
 
The literature on the economic crisis abounds in suggestions of what went wrong before and after the crisis. Thus 
failures appear first as poor economic governance because the State employs ineffective means of correlating and/or, 
whenever possible, correcting macroeconomic indicators which later affect individual decision6making. For example, 
some of the convergence criteria which Member States are required to fulfil prior to joining the Eurozone emerge 
first as economic indicators which went wrong, such as public deficit and spending, growth rate, GDP, or interest 
rates. Valdez and Molyneux15 have identified the following major macroeconomic imbalances: (i) large and persistent 
current account deficits following previous surpluses due to capital flows from emerging to rich industrial economies; 
(ii) a long period of low real interest rates fuelled by deflationary concerns; (iii) a credit boom for home mortgage 
lending which put up the housing prices before the crisis by more than 30%;16 (iv) low interest rates that encouraged 
consumer spending and persuaded banks to take on more risk in various long6term contracts.  
Among the leading variables indicating a financial crisis are rising defaults and government deficits, the rapid 
growth of credit and money supply, rising real interest rates, declining GDP etc.17 
This simplified picture has to be explored in greater depth to identify what went wrong with private and public 
actors, the state, law in action, policy makers, and policy influencers.18 
(A) What went wrong with the state? The state gave access to easy credit (making too much money 
available) through a lax monetary policy (lowering interest rates). It tolerated the ‘shadow banking system’ 
through the transformation of investment banks into holding companies to have access to governmental 
funding,19 and it later bailed out banks which took risks, and therefore encouraged them to indulge in more 
risk6taking.  
(B) What went wrong with private economic actors? Individual economic actors (consumers, borrowers, 
lenders) underestimated the economic cost and took on more risks or engaged in highly hazardous and 
speculative contracts (loans, partly variable mortgage rates, bond and loan insurance contracts).20 In other 
words, consumers failed to be aware of risks to themselves (as if this were possible) and soon, complexity 
was mistaken for sophistication, with consumers assuming that their investments and deposits were safe. 
Corporate managers failed to evaluate risks before entering into complex transactions (securitization, 
investment vehicles, repos, credit default swaps); in sum, the collective solidarity of banks had been oriented 
towards hazardous or foolish risk6taking,21 market indiscipline, and market abuse, irrespective of whether or 
not the bank itself held monopoly power. Managers increased returns by boosting excessive leverage, i.e., 
the return on equity as the major indicator of a firm’s performance.22 In essence, the ownership of capital 
                                                          
15 Supra n 1. 
16 Between 2003 and 2007, source: BIS. 
17 See Tymoigne 102. 
18 See a previous classification in RM Lastra and Wood, ‘The Crisis of 200762009: Nature, Causes, and Reactions’ 13 JIEL (2010) 3, 531; 537; 
L Garicano and R Lastra, ‘Towards a New Architecture for Financial Stability: Seven Principles’ 13 JIEL (2010) 3, 597. 
19 E Avgouleas, ‘The global financial crisis, behavioural finance and financial regulation: in search of a new orthodoxy’ 9 J of Corporate L 
Studies 2009, 23; AM Mateus, ‘Banking Regulatory Reform: ‘Too Big to Fail’ and What Still Needs to be Done’, available on SSRN. The US 
abolished the Glass6Steagall Act 1933 to separate commercial from  investment banking; O Kessler and B Wilhelm, ‘Financialization and the 
Three Utopias of Shadow Banking’ 17 Comp and Change 3 (2013), 251 on information asymmetries and ‘moral’ hazard problems; on 
government failure see ME Stucke, ‘Lessons from the Financial Crisis’ 77 Antitrust LJ, 314. 
20 F Möslein, ‘The focus of regulatory reforms in Europe after the global financial crisis: from corporate to contract governance’ in Sun, Stewart 
and Pollard (eds) 286. 
21 Banks and firms were taking on extensive risks and their solvency was threatened; managers were given incentives to take on greater risks so 
as to generate higher returns for shareholders. On collective moral hazard, see e.g. E Farhi and J Tirole, ‘Collective Moral Hazard, Maturity 
Mismatch and Systemic Bailouts’ Am Ec Rev 2011. 
22 The 2009 Report of the OECD Steering Group on Corporate Governance identified excessive remuneration, risk management, board 
practices and the exercise of shareholder rights as main problematic areas of corporate governance. 
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was financed by debts. 23  The net income generated to shareholders created the bonus culture, while 
compensation schemes encouraged short6run risk6taking. 
(C) What went wrong with policy? Macroeconomic policy registered numerous failures through relaxed 
credit, but austere public spending,24 followed by an industrial restructuring of banks through the application 
of the TBTF doctrine of state intervention in the economy. The lack of competition intervention in the 
banking sector, including investment, insurance, securities, and lending,25 has been significant since less 
interventionist approaches to mergers of large banking institutions allowed them to go ahead and become 
TBTF and ‘Too6Big6to6Supervise’.26 As banks were allowed to merge, they escaped competition scrutiny27 
and were encouraged to compete, which exacerbated risk6taking through the relaxed risk assessment and 
improper disclosure requirements put in place to uncover banks’ speculative pursuits. 28  In 2012, the 
European Commission finally activated its competition policy, which helped to block a mega6merger 
between Deusche Börse and the New York Stock Exchange29 in the market for financial derivatives. 
Many believed that the unaccomplished economic, monetary, and fiscal integration of Member States was 
another culprit, as was the absence of a central authority30 to deal with the crisis. 
(D) What went wrong with law in action? There was a lack of or inadequate regulation of special contracts 
in the banking, financial and securities sector, in particular, the excessive use of securitization as a financial 
innovation to engineer debts ‘cleansing’; excessive sophistication of commercial contracts31 in finance and 
securities; and banking without codes of honest business practices or models of contracts in place for both 
consumers and businesses, in particular, for derivatives trading.32 As investment and commercial banks 
became increasingly sophisticated, they created innovative products which were not priced accurately. It was 
impossible to assess the moral hazard, i.e., risk measurement, due to innovative securitized products.33 The 
use of ‘soft’ law 34  is yet another undemocratic means by which state aid policy has turned current 
competition law into a major restructuring of the banking industry.  
(E) What went wrong with European institutions? As regards institutional responses to the crisis, it took 
until 12 November 2008 for the Commission to propose tighter rules for credit rating agencies; until 29 
April 2009 to present a draft directive on hedge funds, private equity and other alternative investment 
funds;35 until 23 September 2009 to propose a detailed legislative package for financial supervision36 (a 
European Systemic Risk Board for macro6prudential supervision and a micro6prudential supervision 
                                                          
23 Profits had to be paid to bond holders and other creditors plus a competitive return to equity owners; see Kregel, 237. 
24 MH Böheim, ‘Competition policy: ten lessons learnt from the financial crisis’ 38 Empirica (2011) 315. 
25 See for the US JW Markham, ‘Lessons for Competition Law from the Economic Crisis: The Prospect for Antitrust Responses to the ‘Too6
Big6to6Fail’ Phenomenon’, XVI Fordham J of Corporate & Financial Law, 263. 
26  Stucke, 319; on rising bank concentration see FM Scherer, ‘Financial Mergers and their Consequences’ Harvard Kennedy School of 
Government Research Working Paper 19 (2013). 
27 See D Zimmer and L Rengier, ‘Entflechtung, Fusionskontrolle oder Sonderregulierung für systemrelevante Banken? Ansätze zur Lösung des 
‘Too6big6to6fail’ Problems’ 8 Zeitschrift für Wettbewerbsrecht (2010) 105, who proposed a specific merger control, including a 
‘decartelization’ of banks. 
28 Vives, 487. 
29 Case COMP/M6166 Deutsche Börse/NYSE Euronext OJ C 199/2011. 
30 International Monetary Fund 2011. 
31 L Buchheit, ‘We Made it Too Complicated’ 27 Int Financial L Rev (2008) 24 ‘When history looks back on this crisis, a big culprit will be the 
astonishing complexity of modern financial instruments and the drafting of their contracts’. 
32 Brummer, 223. 
33 Innovative products were backed by assets, such as subprime mortgages (loans to high risk borrowers) with short booming span which led to 
an exaggeration of the low risk associated with securitized assets. 
34 C Brummer, ‘Why Soft Law Dominates International Finance6And Not Trade’ 13 JIEL (2010) 3, 623; retrospectively see e.g. AF Lowenfeld, 
‘The International Monetary System: A Look Back Over Seven Decades’ 13 JIEL (2010) 3, 575; JP Trachtman, ‘The International Law of 
Financial Crisis: Spillovers, Subsidiarity, Fragmentation and Cooperation’13 JIEL (2010) 3, 719; G Hufbauer and DD Xie, ‘Financial Stability 
and Monetary Policy: Need for International Surveillance’ 13 JIEL (2010) 3, 939. 
35 Source: EurActiv, ‘Financial Regulation: The EU’s agenda’, 1 April 2009 available at http:www.euractiv.com/euro6finance6regulation6eus6
agenda6linksdossier6188497. 
36 Brummer, 225 is critical on the Basel Committee’s ‘Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision’ which foresee an eventual exit of 
banks that are no longer able to meet supervisory requirements but do not have any mechanism to allow their exit in practice. 
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comprising the European Banking Authority, the European Securities and Market Authority and the 
European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority); until October 2010 to discuss a tax on financial 
transactions; until March 2011 to draft new rules on mortgage lending in the EU; and until June 2011 to 
unveil million6euro fines for rule6breaking bankers. Apart from lax lending policies and wholesale gambling 
on financial markets, poor credit checks run by credit rating agencies37 are other responsible factors, in 
particular, ratings given to securitized mortgages which undermined bank balance sheets.38 Credit rating 
agencies have also been blamed for creating the European sovereign debt crisis due to major conflicts of 
interest and faulty business models.39 
(F) What went wrong with society? None of the above is said to have happened without the usual suspects: 
greed,40 euphoria etc. 
(G) What went wrong with influencers? This refers to leading academic and economic experts who 
influenced policy6making and on whom policy6makers later relied to reshape economic and social 
governance and/or manage the crisis; in particular, there was a fervent reliance on faulty neoclassical 
economic theories41 and liberal ideologies,42 an over6reliance on mathematical risk models which failed to 
adequately predict and mitigate corporate risk,43 and utopian interpretations from the sciences.44 
(H) A knock%on effect of the limits of knowledge? This is attributed to the ‘narrow’ focus of modern antitrust 
law45 and the lack of interdisciplinary understanding, not only of law with other sciences, such as economics 
or sociology, 46  but among competition, contract, finance, banking and corporate law, 47  which led 
Westbrook to explain: 
‘Financial markets are legal. Collateral is a form of property; derivatives are contracts; corporations and fiat money are creatures 
of law. Economics, however, has always aspired to be a natural science, and so has considered the social as if it were natural. This 
fundamental ontological error has led to fanciful pricing models, as if we could model the movements of legal instruments like we 
model the movements of the stars’.48  
In other words, the practical inability of macroeconomics to test its predictions empirically has played a major role 
in the history of global crisis.49 Thus, the use of tools such as statistics and the reliance on macroeconomic models by 
                                                          
37 IOSCO’s Code of Conduct for Credit Rating Agencies was revised in 2008 see IOSCO, Objectives and Principles of Securities Regulation 
(2010), available at http://www.compliance6exchange.com/governance/library/ioscoprinciples2010.pdf. 
38 On credit rating agencies, inadequate risk assessment models, see RM Gadbaw, ‘Systemic Regulation of Global Trade and Finance: A Tale of 
Two Systems’ 13 JIEL (2010) 3, 555. Agencies rated firms as high and investments as low risk. The increased the number of credit rating 
agencies led to increased competition which devalued the standards of their ratings. 
39 Kessler and Wilhelm, 260; N Petit, ‘Credit Rating Agencies, the Sovereign Debt Crisis and Competition Law’ Eur Comp J (2011) 587; see 
Franchoo and Pollard (2012) on the statement of objections against Standard & Poor’s regarding alleged unfair pricing for the use of 
International Securities Identification Numbers. 
40 G Dymski, ‘Bank Lending and the Subprime Crisis’ in Handbook (2013) 413. 
41 ME Stucke, ‘Teaching Antitrust After the Financial Crisis’ 8 J of Business & Technology L 1 (2013), 209 with the suggestion that behavioural 
economics is now ‘mainstream’; P Krugman (2009) argued that the reason for the weakness or deregulation of financial markets is the belief in 
the efficiency and self6correctness of the financial markets; J Crotty, ‘The Realism of Assumptions does Matter: Why Keynes6Minsky Theory 
Must Replace Efficient Market Theory as the Guide to Financial Regulation Policy’ in Handbook (2013) 134. 
42 See RA Posner, A Failure of Capitalism: The Crisis of ’08 and the Descent into Depression (Cambridge, Massachusetts, Harvard Univ Press, 2009). 
Posner identified one of the causes of the crisis as laissez%faire liberalism, 235.  
43 F Akinbami, ‘Is meta6regulation all it’s cracked up to be? The case of UK financial regulation’ 14 J of Banking Regulation 1 (2013) 20. 
44 Utopian interpretations of economic theories such as the trust in the superiority of mathematics, game theory and modelling over rigorous 
disciplines such as law, political science, psychology, sociology and history.   
45Markham, 265. As Pitofsky put it: ‘It is bad history, bad policy and bad law to exclude certain political values in interpreting antitrust law’. 
46 See the insightful contributions of I Lianos, ‘Judging’ Economists: Economic Expertise in Competition Law Litigation: A European View’ in I 
Kokkoris and I Lianos (eds) The Reform of EC Competition Law: New Challenges (Kluwer Law Int, 2010) 185; I Lianos and C Genakos, 
‘Econometric Evidence in EU Competition Law: An Empirical and Theoretical Analysis’ CLES Research Paper 06/2012. 
47 T Cottier, ‘Challenges Ahead in International Economic Law’ 12 JIEC 3 (2009) 12: The financial crisis ‘epitomizes the failures of a strictly 
disciplinary tradition of fragmentation and specialization, and the lack of truly interdisciplinary research’. 
48 D Westbrook, Out of Crisis: Rethinking our Financial Markets (Boulder, Paradigm Publ., 2009). 
49 G Kirchgässner, ‘Die Krise der Wirtschaft: Auch eine Krise der Wirtschaftwissenschaften?’ 10 Perspektiven der Wirtschaftspolitik 4 (2009) 447, 
452 : ‘Dies ist ein Preis, den wir dafür zahlen müssen, dass wir zumindest im Bereich der Makroökonomik –keine experimentelle Wissenschaft 
sind: makroökonomische Experimente sind nie kontrolliert and sollten auch sehr zurückhaltend eingesetzt werden, da sie dann, wenn sie schief 
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central banks has proven to be useful. In particular, micro econometrics has demonstrated how a series of 
macroeconomic measures, specifically those targeting active employment policies, impact upon individuals. 
Nevertheless, these tools remain limited and have proven to be grossly inadequate or even counterproductive in 
practice.50  
One can infer from the above that it is not enough to have identified the real cause or the plethora of causes which 
have contributed to this crisis if the means of correcting the resulting negative effects have not been fully or properly 
implemented. Depending on how we ought to rank them, a preliminary balance of responsibility for wrongdoing sees 
institutional problems of leading authorities which ought to have prevented and managed the crisis (governments, 
regulators), legal problems regarding the economics of special contracts which imply a higher ‘moral’ risk, non6
interventionist competition supervision at a microeconomic level, inadequate supervision of ‘shadow banking,’51 and 
the influence of schools of economics/economists on crisis management. Given the complexity of this crisis, it is 
difficult to identify one major root of the crisis; rather, multiple causes have led to major negative events. In the end, 
there are too many wrongs but no ‘rights’. It is also possible that certain causes are the effect and vice versa. 
Therefore, the first scenario at a microeconomic level starts with what has happened in the subprime mortgage 
lending market and then goes on to question the perceived influence of certain schools of economics/economists to 
verify their plausibility if applied to the current crisis. The problem6question builds upon these previous insights into 
the roots of the crisis. 
 
III. ON THE INTERPLAY OF MICRO  WITH MACROECONOMICS IN THE SUBPRIME 52 
MORTGAGE LENDING MARKET 
 
PROBLEM QUESTION: Is there a ‘behavioural’ or a ‘state’ exploitation of consumers by bankers or states respectively (low rate 
stimulus)? 
    
At a microeconomic level, consumers borrowed more on terms which were favourable in the short term, but the 
long6term effect was building up a bubble due to a lack of economic foresight and human irrationality (a variable 
interest rate inducement coupled with myopia over any eventual job loss), in other words, an unconscionable, moral 
hazard. It is believed that banks intentionally exploited consumers by taking advantage of their well6known decision6
making biases,53 namely, consumers’ tendency to ignore the long6term costs of complex transactions (i.e., hiding the 
real costs) and so opting for an adjustable/variable interest rate, or consumers’ limited experience with transactions 
in the market.54 The relevance of antitrust laws here is the potential to find the behavioural exploitation of consumers 
as a form of deceptive/fraudulent conduct, such as a lender’s omission of terms and conditions. It is a well6established 
principle that offering incomplete information to consumers about the costs of their transaction, through false 
statements or omissions, will give rise to contractual misrepresentation, which, in turn, if it is based on intentional 
behaviour, becomes fraudulent.55 
Unfortunately, the existing consumer protection and available remedies have not been adequate tools for antitrust 
intervention due to an artificial separation of the consumer from antitrust/competition laws.56 The drawback is 
therefore deferring behavioural economics to consumer protection laws which address information asymmetries for 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
gehen, enorme gesellschaftliche Kosten haben können’. Thus one can disagree with the last paragraph since macroeconomic policies have always 
been tested on mankind and citizens have paid the social and economic costs of policy failure. 
50 Ibid. 
51 N Roubini mentioned as part of the shadow banking: broker6dealers, hedge funds, private equity groups, structured investment vehicles, 
money market funds, and non6bank mortgage lenders. 
52 Posner suggested ‘subprime’ as a euphemism for mortgage loans to people at high risk of default, 23. 
53 See also F Akinbami, ‘Retail Products and the Global Financial Crisis’, available on SSRN. 
54 M Huffman and D Heidtke, ‘Behavioural Exploitation Antitrust in Consumer Subprime Mortgage Lending’, available on SSRN. 
55 For a disposition to fraud, see MR Darby and E Karni, ‘Free competition and the optimal amount of fraud’ 16 J of Law and Ec 1973, 67; F 
Akinbami, ‘Financial services and consumer protection after the crisis’ 29 Int J of Bank Marketing 2 (2011) 137. 
56 See NW Averitt & R Lande, ‘Using the ‘Consumer Choice’ Approach to Antitrust Law’ 74 Antitrust LJ 175 (2007); A Albors6Llorens, 
‘Converging Models of Federalisation: Competition and Consumer Law in the EU’. 
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consumers who, as borrowers, are being misled through lenders’ business marketing strategies. Reliable credit 
information is believed to correct information asymmetries 57  through an effective credit reporting mechanism. 
Recently, the hypothesis that lenders are more likely to share credit information when entry barriers are high and the 
threat of competition is low has been rejected empirically due to burdensome administrative costs.58  Banks with 
larger market shares earn higher monopoly rents on their borrower information than do banks with a smaller market 
share. Furthermore, higher entry barriers are associated with lower transparency in credit reporting.59 
Regarding the above as being true at the microeconomic level, at a macroeconomic level, Hayek’s theory of trade 
cycle is worth highlighting as it seems far more influential in present times than it ought to be. Hayek argued that 
interest rates below the ‘natural’ rate lead banks to expand their lending in a manner which is unsustainable.60 This, in 
turn, leads inevitably to a crisis, since businesses are misled to believe that more resources are available than is really 
the case.61 According to his theory, it is then government action or misinformation by the central bank which 
‘awakes’ the crisis through the banking system. In essence, however, the reaction to such governmental stimulus was 
an impulsive entrepreneurial spirit towards excessive lending with the above dramatic effects on the real economy. 
Banks were actually attracted to subprime mortgage lending by higher interest rates of 2% above fixed prime 
lending.62 For consumers, mortgage financing became attractive; for example, a buyer could pay £350,000 with a 
90% mortgage, and three years later, the house price had increased to £500,000. 
According to Austrian economics, the role of the central bank is to maintain price stability so that the money 
supply corresponds to the real GDP. At a European level, price stability has also been firmly grounded in the 
‘convergence’ criteria prescribed by the EU Treaty, which will be discussed in detail shortly. However, the recession 
predicted by Hayek was followed by the Great Depression in 1929 despite successful price stability. Hayek believed 
that the 1927 US Federal Reserve’s intervention in the economy had only delayed, but not fixed the crisis. 
Would it not be sublime to trust Hayek again, and then blame the state for the low interest rates which triggered 
the housing boom, and the ‘Ricardo effect’ for the bubble created thereafter? A serious analysis of the cause%effect6result 
phenomenon shows that but for the low interest rates, consumers would not have mortgaged, bankers would not 
have assumed risky lending, and everybody would have been happy. The shortcoming of the cause6effect platitude is 
that it is precisely the inherent risk and its hazardous multiplication that is the real cause which has resulted in the 
default bubble. However, since the maintenance of a low interest rate is a macroeconomic state policy, one could argue 
that it was the widespread reliance on this policy which created this mess. The interest6rate6effect in macroeconomics 
postulates that a rising price level pushes up the interest rate, which in turn, lowers consumption and new 
investments in plant and equipment.63 
However, it would be naive to assume that a mortgage multiplier could eventually create a crisis of such 
proportions. There are other trading exchanges, such as credit default swaps, which operated much in the same way 
or even worse. In contrast, others have argued that under the influence of neoliberalism, the economy ‘benefited’ 
from an explosion of public and private credit.64 
Another belief is that a recession is able to destructively correct the errors of a boom. In other words, bad 
businesses will collapse, which explains, partially, the rescue mechanisms put in place by the Commission. In contrast 
to the previous credit boom period, interest rates have to be higher to collect through deposit savings the monies 
needed for the liquidity of banks which are ‘due’ to collapse. This view has been contradicted more recently, because 
                                                          
57 A Padilla and M Pagano, ‘Sharing default information as a borrower discipline device’ European Economic Rev (1951). 
58 M Bruhn, S Farazi and M Kanz, ‘Bank Competition, Concentration, and Credit Reporting’, The World Bank Development Research Group, 
Finance and Private Sector Development Team, Policy Research Working Paper 64422/2013, 5. 
59 Ibid, 16. 
60 FA Hayek, Prices and Production (London, Routledge, 1931). 
61 RCB Miller, ‘The Austrians and the Crisis’ Economic Affairs (Blackwell Publ, Oxford, 2009) 28. 
62 Research has also found a link between the use of aggressive mortgage lending and house price volatility, see A Pavlov and S Wachter, 
‘Subprime Lending and House Price Volatility’ Univ of Pennsylvania Institute for Law and Economics, Research Paper no 08/33 (2008). 
63 Slavin 257. 
64 O’Connor 704. 
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‘the liquidity problems were not created by ban runs initiated by depositors, but by the unexpected decline in the 
value of financial assets and by the consequent reduction of interbank lending’.65 
The level of interest rates is also said to depend upon the depth of the recession.66 Anecdotal evidence of the 
promised triple%dip recession proves how interest rates for savings have also not been tripled, much to our own 
economic loss and consternation. In contrast, states were able to borrow at historically low interest rates.67 Following 
the Austrian economics’ advice, the State has failed to raise interest rates significantly.68 Rather, it has simulated a 
destructive recession and has practically restructured banks through recapitalisation, the difference this time being 
that the resources which allowed this to happen have flown directly and freely from European taxpayers (instead of 
crediting their saving accounts) to hazardous risk6takers. Nevertheless, irrespective of whether the process of 
restructuring itself should not have been implemented effectively, the real worry turns on to whether this sacrifice is 
actually worth anything? 
Furthermore, the reverse of not encouraging government spending for fear of any taxation mismatch or of a 
pervasive inflationist course seems equally odd as it results in austerity, which promotes job cuts and raises 
unemployment levels. Whether we like it or not, the European austerity obsession has delivered economic failure, 
social poverty, migration and unprecedented levels of unemployment, which will be documented in this paper. Now, 
to return to Hayek’s prescription of ‘flexible’ wages, i.e., cutting wages to minimise unemployment and combat 
inflation, the latter being currently low at 1.7%, it is worth revealing that global population69 growth is more than 
three times higher than 1.8 bn, as it was in the 1920s. This makes one particularly circumspect of creative ideas of 
‘full’ employment in real terms70 as applied to a different historical level in society’s development. In the EU, the last 
total population revealed by Eurostat in 2012 was 503.7 million, not counting 4.2 million Croatians. As nearly 26.2 
million unemployed European citizens account for 10.8% of the active work force, it means that we have an active 
population of 235.8 million but only 212.22 million employed citizens. If my calculations are accurate, the EU has 
just 41.7% of its total population in ‘full’ employment. This dramatic unemployment situation comes just after what I 
would call a Failed Financialization of Big Banks, and proves that what Stiglitz has already suggested about 
macroeconomic multipliers is true,71 namely, that assessed retrospectively, the process of European restructuring of 
banks, with its overly generous stimulus package, has failed to generate either jobs or any extra GDP.72 The record 
unemployment rate in the EU does not exceed the 200 million estimate of the International Labour Organization as a 
global crisis unemployment figure.73 However, macroeconomics suggests that only an unemployment rate of 20% 
triggers a depression.74 
Another cause of the fragile growth lies in the more restrictive and austere macroeconomic policies that are 
necessary to achieve the economic and monetary union.75 Nevertheless, it is clear that Austrian economics offer at 
least one excellent tip: if undertaken, bank recapitalisation and state control is most likely to be unsuccessful. This is 
true in the EU when one looks at the bleak industry predictions available so far and the high unemployment rate.  
To my surprise, therefore, I find I agree with Stiglitz’s suggestion that it was the rejection of the Keynesian theory 
of employment,76 as a promoter of rigid wages,77 which formed the basis of the many post6Keynesian doctrines and 
                                                          
65 Heimler and Jenny 363. 
66 Ibid, 31. 
67 Grahl, 43 noting examples such as Japan (0.96%), Germany (2.40%), US (2.56%), France (2.86%), UK (3%). 
68 Ibid. 
69 Currently estimated at approximately 7 bn. 
70 On the rejection of ‘full’ employment see L von Mises, Human Action (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1949). 
71 J Stiglitz, ‘The global crisis, social protection and jobs’ 148 Int Labour Rev (2009) 1, 4. 
72 See e.g. J Bivens and H Shierholz, ‘The Great Recession’s Impact on Jobs, Wages, and Incomes’ in Handbook (2013) 61. 
73 Clarke, 43. 
74 SL Slavin, Macroeconomics (McGraw6Hill, Irwin, Boston, 9th ed, 2009) 218. 
75 See e.g. G Grahl, ‘The Subordination of European Finance’ 15 Comp and Change 1 (2011) 34; J Stiglitz, ‘Towards a Better Measure of Well6
being’ Financial Times, September 13, 2009. 
76 See Keynes’ letter to TS Elliot in DE Moggridge (Ed) The Collected Writings of John Maynard Keynes: Activities 1940%1946. Shaping the Post%War 
World: Employment and Commodities vol 27 (London, Macmillan, 1980), 384:‘the full employment policy by means of investment is only one 
particular application of an intellectual theorem. You can produce the result just as well as by consuming more or working less (…). How you 
mix up the three ingredients of a cure is a matter of taste and experience, i.e. of morals and knowledge.’ 
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undermined job protection and labour rights.78 Nonetheless, the greatest revelation comes with the realisation that by 
rejecting Keynes outright, since Article 3 (3) TEU only aspires (‘aim’) ‘to achieve full employment’ and leaves social 
policy in the invisible hands of Member States, this has been too Hayekian.79 In macroeconomics, a 5% unemployment 
rate means that the economy attains full employment.80 The misconstruction of employment theory, with a strong 
emphasis on its ‘utopian’ vision of full employment, can be justified by the distrust of wage competition, which even 
if it could achieve labour flexibility, does so at the expense of worsening workers’ conditions. According to Keynes, 
lowering wages would lower workers’ incomes and reduce further spending on goods.81 This makes Keynesian theory 
socially human, thus Keynes believed that capitalism has a natural tendency to cut employment.82 Keynes believed 
that the self6correcting mechanisms of falling interest rates, prices, and wages are insufficient to stimulate investment 
and consumption83 as a way out of the recession.84 In other words, without government intervention, the economy 
does not move toward full employment. Thus it can be said that the Keynesian policies implemented in the 1950s and 
1960s were inappropriately addressing deflation after it had ceased to represent a major threat.85 Therefore, Minsky’s 
financial fragility theory postulated that the trade cycle reacts to endogenous shocks, such as a change in monetary 
policy by the central bank (e.g. increasing interest rates to slow the economy for fear of inflation, or a supra6
production crisis where markets are saturated with cars, electronics etc.)86 and that a deficient aggregate demand 
triggers a stagnant unemployment situation, which could eventually attain Keynesian full employment through 
monetary (e.g. government spending) and fiscal policy.87 
If nothing else works, another option suggested by Austrian economics is to promote competition in currency 
exchange. Obviously, this did not work well for the Eurozone countries which could not devalue their national 
currencies.88 Finally, as a last resort, tax is also viewed with much scepticism.89 Though granting temporary facilities 
to individuals contributes to raising the level of savings deposits, which, in turn, actively stimulates consumption, if it 
also targets those consumer goods that are to be produced in the long run and further imports, direct tax helps all too 
little. Since 50% of the lower taxed goods account for only 2.8% of revenues, while the upper 5% account for 
63.5%, and because the marginal consumption rate falls as earnings increase, then adjusting the private consumption 
deficit through direct taxation is thus possible for the category of lower income taxation. Therefore, trying to fix a 
crisis through taxation is nothing but a vicious circle. 
These insights all reveal how unhelpful economic policies or economists’ predictions90 are; how the crisis has 
destroyed them one after another, thereby shaking our society in the search for social justice, the rule of law, and a 
new order; and how this crisis managed to exacerbate its social and economic costs instead of ‘fixing’ the economy. 
 
IV. ON THE MACROECONOMICS OF THE EURO CRISIS 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
77 See JM Keynes, ‘The General Theory of Employment’ 51 Quarterly J of Ec (1937) 209; Keynes, The General Theory of Employment, Interest and 
Money (London, Macmillan, 1973), also available at www.isn.ethz.ch. 
78 Ibid, 9. 
79 On the rise of neoliberalism with free market theory, monetarism, supply6side and conservative economics, renewed interest in Hayek and 
bias against Keynesian theory, see DM Kotz, ‘Changes in the Postwar Global Economy and the Roots of the Financial Crisis’ in Handbook (2013) 
399. 
80 Slavin 258. 
81 Ibid 262. 
82 Kirchgässner 462. 
83 On government spending, Keynes said that ‘quantity is more relevant than quality. Even if the government employed some people to dig 
holes and others to fill up those holes’; see Slavin 368. 
84 Slavin 268. 
85 E Tymoigne, ‘Financial fragility’ in Handbook of Critical Issues in Finance J Toporowski and J Michell (eds) (Cheltenham, Elgar, 2012) 100. 
86  Macroeconomics describes the saturation of markets through the innovation theory where economic downturn continues until a new 
innovation takes hold. Another endogenous theory focuses on psychological factors whereas optimism triggers investments in plants, more jobs 
and consumer spending. 
87J Kregel, ‘Hyman P. Minsky‘ in Handbook (2012) 237. 
88 Another suggestion has been to create a mechanism by which Member States with a current account deficit could devalue in real terms and 
other Member States with a surplus could revalue. 
89 Kirchgässner 462. 
90 LJ Peter, Peter’s Quotations: ‘An economist is an expert who will know tomorrow why the things he predicted yesterday didn’t happen today.’ 
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Article 119 (2) TFEU refers to a single currency, namely, the euro, monetary policy, and exchange6rate policy. Its 
primary objective is to maintain price stability and to support the general economic policies in the Union, in 
accordance with the ‘principle of an open market economy with free competition’. This principle means that at a 
microeconomic level, free competition will be complemented by macroeconomic policy. According to Article 119 
(3), macroeconomic policy shall comply with the following guiding principles: stable prices, sound public finances 
and monetary conditions, and a sustainable balance of payments.  
Therefore, Article 140 (1) TFEU sets out the Maastricht convergence criteria for the accession of Member States 
to the single currency. These nominal terms are tight. They mandate that every two years the Commission and the 
ECB report to the Council on the progress made by the Member States regarding the achievement of economic and 
monetary union, with a view of the achievement of a high degree of sustainable convergence. The criteria refer 
respectively to the ‘achievement, sustainability, observance and durability’ of: 
(i) a high degree of price stability by looking at the inflation rate of the three best performing 
Member States;91  
(ii) the sustainability of the government financial position, by looking at the public deficit;  
(iii) normal fluctuation margins provided for by the exchange6rate mechanism without 
devaluing against the euro;  
(iv) convergence achieved by the Member State with derogation and its participation in the 
exchange6rate mechanism being reflected in the long6term interest6rate levels. 
The primary objective of price stability is also mentioned under Article 105 of the Protocol on the European System 
of Central Banks (ESCB). 
In sum, the above economic criteria refer to the following nominal values: inflation (lower than 1.5%), exchange 
rate (+/6 15%), long6term interest rates (no more than 2% higher than the unweighted arithmetic coverage of the 
similar 106year government bond yields in the 3 Member States with the lowest HICP inflation), budget deficit 
(lower than 3% GDP) and a government public debt criterion (lower than 60%). These criteria aim to establish 
financial responsibility. Thus, they do not include output per head and unemployment rates. In the last paragraph of 
Article 140, it is stressed that the monitoring reports ‘shall also take account of the results of the integration of 
markets, the situation and development of the balances of payments on current account and an examination of the 
development of unit labour costs and other price indices’.  
 
A. CURRENT ECONOMIC OUTLOOK 
 
To start, figures provided in a previous review undertaken by the Commission during 2012 read as follows:92 
 
 Real Gross Domestic Product (GDP) Growth in the EU (2009)                64.2% 
 Unemployment in the EU (Autumn 2010)                                                   9.6% 
 General Government deficit in the EU (2009, % of EU GDP)                    6.8% 
 State aid for banks, including unused guarantees (% of EU GDP)                 13%                                                             
 
The current economic situation reveals interesting insights into the state of the economy and eventually justifies 
bailouts. Inflation has generally been higher than 2%. According to the latest Eurostat figures,93 the annual inflation 
rate in the Eurozone area was 1.6% in July 2013 compared to 2.4% a year earlier. The annual inflation rate in the 
European Union was 1.7% in July 2013.94 Therefore, a country with a relatively low (high) inflation rate has a 
relatively high (low) real interest rate. However, monetary policy has been operated in a perverse manner, with low 
                                                          
91It will be inferred from a rate of inflation which is close to that of the three best performing Member States. 
92 Source: EU Commission, Towards More Responsibility and Competitiveness in the European Financial Sector, 2012. 
93 Eurostat, euro indicators, press release 123/2013, 16 August 2013. 
94 The largest increase to the euro area annual inflation is said to come from fruit, vegetables and tobacco. 
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real rates being applied where inflation is relatively high. This contradicts the presumption that high inflation is met 
by high real rates of interest to dampen demand. Many economists agree that compared with the Bank of England and 
the US Federal Reserve (FED), which have reduced aggressive interest rates, the ECB has adopted a stricter 
approach. In April 2011, interest rates reached 1.25%. Apart from the existing large current account imbalances 
between the EMU Member States, there are also substantial differences in terms of changes in unit labour costs. 
Unemployment rose to 26.2 million in January 2013, which accounts for 10.8% of the active population95 and 
11.9% of the active population in the euro area (19 million). However, long6term unemployment reached another 
‘historical high’96 in the third quarter at 11.2 million, which is 86% higher than four years earlier. It is also worth 
highlighting that according to Eurostat, youth unemployment reached its peak in January this year with 23.6% of 
active youths.97 EU immigration was 20.7 million in January 2012 and EU migration was 13.6 million.98 In addition, 
25.7% of people aged between 55664 were living in poverty and social exclusion,99 while the EU lowest average 
salary was just 393 euros (Bulgaria).100 In 24 Member States, the likelihood of finding a job was lower in the third 
quarter of 2012 than four years before.101 
Major planned cuts in the industry sector cast rather a bleak shadow over the overall economy. For example, in the 
banking sector, Commerzbank is implementing a global restructuring plan targeting between 4000 and 6000 job 
losses by 2016; in the airline sector, Iberia is cutting 19% of its entire workforce (3807 employees) and Air Berlin 
another 900 by 2014,102 while the manufacturing sector lost 36964 jobs last year, and financial intermediation 19585. 
In the car industry, Renault announced 7500 job cuts by the end of 2016, and Fiat Poland another 1450 jobs.103 The 
worst prognosis is in the construction industry, and wholesale and retail trade as a result of significant reductions in 
terms of output, added value, and employment.104  
 
B. THE ‘EFFICIENCY’ JUSTIFICATION AGAINST BAILOUTS OF INEFFICIENT BANKS OR STATES 
 
Article 119 makes it clear that the adoption of an economic policy which is based on the ‘close coordination’ of 
Member States’ economic policies, on the internal market, and on common objectives has to be in accordance with 
the principle of an open market economy with free competition. Competition law rarely accepts a failing6firm6
defence on the grounds of its poor economic performance, that is, inefficiency. Article 120 also makes it clear that 
economic policies ought to follow the same principle, ‘favouring an efficient allocation of resources’. Furthermore, 
Article 123 (1) contains an imperative prohibition of ‘overdraft facilities or any other type of credit facility with the 
ECB or with the central banks of the Member States in favour of Union institutions, bodies, offices or agencies, 
central governments, regional, local or other public authorities, other bodies governed by public law, or public 
undertakings of Member States’ as well as ‘the purchase directly from them by the ECB or national central banks of 
debt instruments’. One cannot possibly comment more on the legally binding hierarchy and ‘constitutional’ ranking 
of the above provisions, which clearly eliminate the possibility of granting bailouts on the basis of inefficiency, be it at 
state or TBTF level, without basically undermining the rule of law and transforming the spirit of free competition 
into coercive freedom, the meaning of which will be discussed towards the end of this article. 
                                                          
95 European Commission, EU Employment and Social Situation Quarterly Rev March (2013) 5. Other high unemployment rates were recorded 
in Bulgaria (64.9%), Cyprus (64.8%) and Spain (64.5%). 
96 Ibid, 6. 
97 The youth unemployment rate ranges from 15% or more in Austria, Denmark, Germany and the Netherlands to 55% or more in Greece and 
Spain. Highest unemployment rates were registered in Greece (66.5%) and Portugal (64.3%) while their GDP also fell to 66% and 63.8% 
respectively. 
98 Ibid, 15. 
99 Ibid 24. 
100 Ibid 28. 
101 Ibid 30. 
102 Ibid 66. 
103 Ibid 65. 
104 Ibid, 58. 
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Competition intervention in favour of TBTF banks has been implemented through crisis communication. It has 
been argued for some time now that state aid communications bear no legally binding force.105 Thus, they are 
implementing administrative provisions and offer guidance on how to deal with the restructuring or capitalisation of 
banks. Therefore, a higher hierarchical and constitutionally accepted rescue provision is Article 107 (3) b TFEU on 
state aid to ‘remedy a serious disturbance in the economy of a Member State’. This has practically closed the academic 
debate over the primacy of ‘hard’ over ‘soft’ law.106 Thus, I would call the latter an administrative law which has 
binding force. No legal act or decision whatsoever would otherwise be enacted if it were to be disregarded. 
Furthermore, if it were legally valid that ‘soft law’ communications are not binding on European courts, this would 
be instrumental, one the one hand, for states to claim disgorgement of profits for cashed bailouts of banks engaged in 
fraudulent pursuits and, on the other hand, for EU citizens to claim fair compensation through taxation. It would be 
legitimate for them to pay lower taxes until the almost 40% of the GDP in bailouts was credited on their payroll 
accounts. 
In conclusion, the apparent legitimacy of state bailouts is in the treaty; the implementation of banks bailouts is in 
administrative law communications. 
 
V. ON THE SOCIAL COSTS OF THE CRISIS 
 
 
A. HOW MUCH STATE AID DO YOU NEED? 
 
Some evolutionary insights into how state aid gradually progressed reveal that between 2002 and 2007, the amount of 
state aid decreased by 2% annually, i.e. €65 bn or 0.5% of the GDP,107 followed in 2008 by a nearly four–fold 
increase to 2.2% of the GDP, of which €279.6 bn was spent on state aid and €212.2 bn on crisis measures, i.e. 1.7% 
GDP. Between 2008 and 2009, the figure of €3.632 bn, the equivalent of 29% GDP, signalled an alarming shift of 
perspective when everybody started to ‘see red’.  
Nevertheless, even ‘ad hoc’ state aid in favour of individual financial institutions amounted to €587 bn (9% 
GDP).108 Member States such as Germany, the UK and France, which make up 60% of the EU banking sector, 
received 60% of the total amount of state aid granted.109 A total of 215 financial institutions received some form of 
aid, but 114 received toxic asset support relief.110 Between 2008 and 2011, the Commission approved a shocking 
€4.5 trillion of state aid, that is, nearly 36.7% of the EU GDP.111 This makes the entire GDP worth €12.26 trillion.112 
Minus the bailouts, the remaining €7.76 trillion is approaching another Great Depression as macroeconomics suggests 
that at extremely low levels of real GDP, when output is €3 trillion, the economy is in a depression.113 
The social and economic costs estimated for the UK economy post6intervention are from £1 bn to £3 bn per 
annum, which means nearly £40 bn of lost output.114 Other macroeconomic crisis mechanisms, such as the EU 
                                                          
105 See e.g. T Doleys, ‘Managing State Aid in a Time of Crisis: Commission Crisis Communications and the Financial Sector Bailout’ 34 J of Eur 
Integration 6 (2012) 549. 
106 See the comprehensive and insightful contributions on soft law of O Stefan, Soft law in court: competition law, state aid and the Court of Justice of 
the European Union (Kluwer Law Int, 2013); ‘Hybridity before the court: a hard look at soft law in the EU competition and state aid case law’ 37 
European L Rev (2012) 49. 
107 P Nicolaides, ‘State aid’ in I Kokkoris and R Olivares6Caminal (eds) Antitrust Law amidst Financial Crisis (Cambridge, CUP, 2010). 
108 Lyons and Zhu, 47. 
109 Quigley, 240. It is worth recalling that during 2008/09 Germany received €400 in guarantees, €80 in recapitalization, €1.5 liquidity aid, and 
€107.6 for other individual cases, while UK received respectively €376.75, €63, €11.3 and €61.2 for the same categories of state aid. 
110 Ibid. 
111  Source: DG COMP at http://ec.europa/competition/recovery/financial_sector.html. See e.g. Pisani6Ferry and Sapir, n, 358, who 
mentioned that by the end of August 2009 state aid measures amounted to 44% GDP 
112  See http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/gulf_countries/press_corner/index_en.htm; 
http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/eurostat/home/. 
113 Slavin, 262. 
114 This is why several economists have argued that countries facing insolvency should default as quickly as possible to allow a substantial debt 
restructuring (haircut) aimed at restoring sustainable debt levels and stabilising financial markets. The UK government spent $856 bn to support 
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Stabilisation Mechanism, allow the Commission to raise up to €60 bn as financial assistance to Member States 
experiencing financial difficulties. The EU Financial Stability Facility has been set up to issue debt securities 
guarantees of up to €444 bn.115 Therefore it does not make us feel any better to know that in 2009, the US bailout 
amounted to $8 trillion,116 that is $30,000 per citizen, $650 bn of GDP income, 5.5 million jobs, $360 bn in wages 
etc.117 This has made academics suggest that instead of rewarding those institutions that caused the crisis, it would 
have been much better to write a $120,000 cheque to a household of four to keep up with their mortgage payments. 
Recent figures contradict a 2009 estimate by the International Monetary Fund of $11.9 trillion as the total cost of the 
global crisis.118 
It is by no means controversial to say that banks were being favoured before the current crisis hit. Banks were 
immune from competition intervention and allowed to merge, which is another fact that is statistically documented. 
Between 1997 and 2007, the number of EU banks declined by 29% compared to 22% in the US. 119  Bank 
concentration levels remain relatively high post6crisis, while recent research contradicts the economic assumption 
that concentration levels should necessarily translate into high market shares.120 Against the shortcoming of immunity 
to competition agency scrutiny,121 it does not follow that banks did not compete against each other. Another telling 
fact is that it is precisely tougher competition that has increased the risk6taking incentives of banks and pushed them 
to pursue risky portfolios.122 Shareholders have designed compensation contracts to insure managers against failure 
and incentivize risk6taking. Therefore, keeping this numeracy exercise in mind is essential when questioning how 
state aid has been spent on banks. 
 
B. MAIN CATEGORIES OF CRISIS STATE AID 
 
So far the EU has offered €2,738 bn in bank guarantee schemes, €231 bn in the form of the recapitalisation of banks, 
and €76 bn in the form of general liquidity measures and asset relief. The crisis of state aid emerged following the 
collapse of Lehman Brothers. The first €26 bn bailout went to the German IKB and Sachsen LB, which had been 
exposed to asset6backed securities in the US subprime market. This was followed by the UK bailout of Northern 
Rock, late 2007 and early 2008. Then, WestLB, Fortis and Dexia followed. The Irish Daily offered €400 bn as a 
guarantee scheme to cover retail, commercial, and interbank deposits.  
The Commission’s crisis reaction was to issue an administrative act, the Banking communication,123 following which 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
the crisis in 2008; see Clarke 44. 
115 Source: European Commission, MEMO/12/413, Brussels 6 June 2012. Other notable aids include €50 bn to the Hellenic Stability Financial 
Fund for the purpose of bank capitalisation; €12 bn of the Bank Solvency Support Facility in Portugal marked on a dedicated account at the 
central bank; €600 mill for Latvian banking support. 
116 Thus Moseley reports $700 bn in order to bail out US banks; see F Moseley, ‘The Bailout of the ‘Too6Big6to6Fail’ Banks: Never Again’ in 
Handbook (2013) 645. 
117 See e.g. ‘The Nature and Effects of the 200762010 Crisis and Ways to Resolve it’ in R Macdonald, Genesis of the Financial Crisis (London, 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2012). 
118 W Sun, J Stewart and D Pollard, ‘Introduction: rethinking corporate governance –lessons from the global financial crisis’ in Sun, Stewart 
and Pollard (eds) Corporate Governance and the Global Financial Crisis: International Perspectives (Cambridge, CUP, 2011). 
119 X Vives, ‘Competition policy in banking’ 27 Oxford Rev of Economic Policy 3 (2011) 482. 
120 Scherer 10. 
121 For example, the US Dodd6Frank Act of July 2010 prohibited any merger or acquisition which results in a combined market share of more 
than 10% of domestic deposits, the concentration limit on any consolidation being 10% of financial industry liabilities. This Act aims to 
promote the financial stability of the US, by improving accountability and transparency in the financial system, to protect the American 
taxpayer by ending bailouts, and to protect consumers from abusive financial services practices. 
122 Vives 485. 
123 Communication from the Commission –The Application of State Aid Rules to Measures Taken in Relation to Financial Institutions in the 
Context of the Current Global Financial Crisis, OJ C 270/8 of 25 October 2008, departs from its predecessor EC Guidelines on State Aid for 
Rescuing and Restructuring Firms in Difficulty, OJ C 244/2 of 1 October 2004. The latter allowed the Commission to distinguish among 
guarantees, recapitalizations, impaired assets measures, as aid modalities, and their recipient, distressed firms. The Banking Communication 
  Durham Law School                                     Draft article forthcoming vol 16 CYELS                     Anca D Chirita   
                
14 
 
it received notifications for guarantee schemes, recapitalization, and other interventions of up to €2 trillion.124 This 
aid was still insufficient to restore market confidence as bank balance sheets continued to erode. The ECB intervened 
through liquidity operations. The Commission’s disagreement with French institutions over ‘preventive 
recapitalization’ caused alarm bells to ring in that there were some serious doubts over whether €10.5 bn125 was, 
indeed, offered to TBTF banks. In this context, the Commission issued its Recapitalization communication,126 which 
provided guidance on the pricing of capital injections. It distinguished between ‘distressed’ and ‘fundamentally sound’ 
banks.127 The former were required to pay higher coupon rates. 
Following German plans to create a series of special purpose vehicles (SPV) and a heated debate over assets 
pricing, the Commission issued its Impaired assets communication128 to handle toxic assets. Asset relief in the form of 
asset purchase has meant that the state would buy the impaired asset portfolio at a fixed price, but higher than the 
market price. On the basis of toxic asset guarantees, the State has practically taken over a share of the default risk and 
losses.129 The conditions for granting such aids required full disclosure of the assets; sharing the cost between Member 
States, shareholders and creditors, and coordination among them; and restructuring distressed banks.130 The German 
scheme allowed financial institutions to transfer structured securities to a ‘special purpose vehicle’ for a period of 20 
years and bear the full risk of losses. 
Another Restructuring communication131 targeted banks with unsustainable business models. Banks were required to 
demonstrate their own strategies to achieve long6term viability without State aid under adverse economic conditions, 
known as a bank ‘stress’ test.132 The restructuring of banks began with Commerzbank,133 which had previously 
received €18 bn from the German government. The bank was required to divest itself of its investment banking and 
real estate and accepted a short6term ban on acquisitions. Its overall business contracted ex post at approximately €500 
bn (45%).134 Other restructured banks included RBS, Lloyds, Anglo Irish Bank, Fortis, Dexia, Bayern LB, HSH 
Nordbank, IKB, West LB, ING and ABN Amro. 
As Lyons and Zhu have rightfully commented, the above ‘zombie’ banks ‘absorb savings and withdraw lending as 
they rebuild their own capital, to the detriment of lending to the non6financial sector’,135 thereby contributing to the 
current recession. Another excellent point to make is the need to reform any banking system that ‘privatises profits 
and socialises losses’.136 The EU intervention in the banking sector, on the basis of its flawed TBTF doctrine of state 
intervention in the economy, has transferred the economic responsibility of inefficient corporations to the social 
responsibility of individual taxpayers.137 
The above developments in administering state aid have practically changed the whole structure of the banking 
sector in a way which has substantially departed from the traditional prevention of distortions of competition. The 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
made possible the authorisation of state aid in the form of guarantees, capital, asset relief or liquidity on a non6discriminatory basis, for a limited 
time and scope, see e.g. Quigley 239. 
124 Doleys 556. 
125 Doleys 558. 
126 Communication from the Commission –The Recapitalisation of Financial Institutions in the Current Financial Crisis: Limitation of Aid to the 
Minimum Necessary and Safeguards against Undue Distortions of Competition, OJ C 10/2 of 15 January 2009. 
127 Quigley 239; see also T Franchoo and M Pollard, ‘The Application of European Competition Law in the Financial Services Sector’ J of 
European Comp Law & Practice (2012). 
128 Communication from the Commission on the Treatment of Impaired Assets in the Community Banking Sector, OJ C 72/01 of 26 March 
2009. 
129 Quigley 239. 
130 Ibid. 
131 Commission Communication, The return to viability and the assessment of restructuring measures in the financial sector in the current crisis 
under the State aid rules, OJ 2009 C 195/9. 
132 Quigley 239. 
133 Commerzbank case N 625/2008; see e.g. Heimler and Jenny 364 criticisms on the imposition by the Commission of limitations on 
managers’ compensation and severance packages. 
134 Doleys 561. 
135 B Lyons and M Zhu, ‘Compensating Competitors or Restoring Competition? EU Regulation of State Aid for Banks during the Financial 
Crisis’ 13 J of Industrial Comp and Trade (2013) 45. 
136 Ibid 47. 
137 See  FM Scherer, ‘A Perplexed Economists Confronts ‘Too Big to Fail’ 7 Eur J of Comparative Econ 2 (2010) 267. 
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next question to ask, therefore, is not whether competition enforcers have not been prepared to undertake this 
mission, because, obviously, they weren’t, but to ask how much state aid has been taken away from the overall 
prospects of economic growth in terms of GDP and weighted against, as mentioned earlier, the rising unemployment 
in the EU and the passing on of social costs through taxation. Finally, this revolutionary change of perspective makes 
competition law and policy the scapegoat of a New Banks Deal. Its story of success for banks and failure for citizens 
has been possible on the basis of the Union’s democratic deficits, since its citizens have no say in the next election of 
the President or of the College of Commissioners, both of which have been instrumental in matters of competition 
policy.138 This point uncovers an existing institutional crisis; for example, the European Commission’s plans to create 
an agency to rescue or shut failed banks by 2015 against the significant backdrop of not having a European banking 
union until January 2014, after the general elections in Germany.139 The latter aspect pinpoints the politics of the 
crisis. Recent research suggests that, for a number of reasons, electoral competition is likely to constrain the abuse of 
public resources in the form of bailouts.140 This is fully evidenced in the following criticism by a member of Socialists 
and Democrats (Elisa Ferreira) who said: ‘We need to stop casino banking, break the link between public finance and 
failing banks, and ensure sustainable financing of the real economy to encourage growth’. As Wibbels rightfully put it 
when investigating the constitutional dimension of crisis bailouts,141  the above statement based on ‘competitive 
politics’ encourages what one would call famously in competition a way of ‘publicly distancing oneself’142 from the 
culprit of bailouts. Electoral competition should actively discourage zombie banks from looking at the welfare state as 
their lender of last resort. In conclusion, what this bitter ‘crisis’ has taught us, so far, is that structural changes happen 
during a crisis whenever state intervention is insufficiently backed up by constitutional and institutional safeguarding 
mechanisms since it is easier to abuse the rule of law on the basis of predicted, imminent economic downturn. 
 
C. STATE AID FOR NON CHAMPION BANKS143  
 
The following table illustrates who are the top ‘zombie’ bank beneficiaries. 
 TBTF BANKS 
 rescue aids: Hypo Real Estate Holding, Commerzbank, WestLB; 
 restructuring: Sachesen LB, IKB, West LB, Landesbank Baden Württemberg, Sparkasse KölnBonn, 
Hypo Real Estate, HSH Nordbank, NordLB, Bayern LB; 
 WestLB €3 bn capital injections, €11 impaired assets of which €3.4 bn.144 
 Anglo Irish Bank €29.3 bn 
 Irish Nationwide Building Society (INBS) €5.4 bn; 
 Hypo Real Estate €9.95 bn in capital injections, €145 in guarantees and €20 bn in asset relief; 
 ING €17 bn 
 Fortis Bank €11.2 bn 
 
                                                          
138 In contrast, architectural differences did not allow the US antitrust enforcers to administer bailouts through means of antitrust policy; see 
e.g. the Remarks of Bert Foer, President of the American Antitrust Institute, ‘Competition Policy and ‘Too Big’ Banks in the European Union 
and the United States’, June 27, 2013. 
139 Source: EurActiv, New banking authority pits Commission against Berlin, 11 July 2013 available at http://www.euractiv.com/print/euro6
finance/new6banking6resolution6authority6news... 
140 E Wibbels, ‘Bailouts, Budget, and Leviathans: Comparative Federalism and Lessons from the Early United States’ 36 Comparative Political 
Studies (2003) 486. 
141 Wibbels 487. 
142 To quote David Bailey’s excellent article on ‘Publicly Distancing Oneself from a Cartel’ 31 World Comp 1 (2008) 177. 
143 For an overview of decisions and ongoing in6depth investigations in the context of the financial crisis, see European Commission, Brussels, 
20 December 2012, available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press6release_MEMO61261018_en.htm 
144 The state aid was said to be incompatible with the restructuring communication as it exceeded the real economic value of this banks’ assets. 
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D. FAMOUS GOVERNMENT BAILOUTS IN THE UNITED KINGDOM 
 
Northern Rock (fifth largest UK mortgage bank with a 9.7% market share of UK gross mortgage lending (18.9% net)145 
received £20 bn as a retail deposit guarantee scheme plus a further £25 bn liquidity facility from the Bank of England. 
There is disagreement over whether Northern Rock was a systemically important bank since it did not trigger 
problems elsewhere in the banking system.146  Elsewhere, it has been argued that it was precisely the Bank of 
England’s intervention that did not allow this to happen. Unfortunately, NR created a precedent of intervention on 
the basis of TBTF. It is also useful to recall here that the ECB identified some 46 systemically important banks which 
account for 68% of EU banking.147 This is the result of allowing mega6mergers to go ahead148 and the monopoly 
power of banks on business lending.149 
Royal Bank of Scotland (RBS) received £45 bn to ensure its survival because the bank was under6capitalised, failed to 
maintain adequate liquidity, and was involved in a risky financial strategy. It had previously participated in a 
consortium along with Fortis and Santander to acquire ABN AMRO.150 
Lloyds TSB/HBOS, as a result of a rescue merger with HBOS,151 received £17 bn state recapitalisation in January 
2009152 (the UK government has recently sold part of its 43.5% equity ownership), with £260 bn of toxic assets 
temporarily insured. According to the OFT (2010), Lloyds was the second largest bank with 30% market shares in 
personal current accounts and a 24% market share in gross mortgage lending, while HSBC had only 16% and 13% 
respectively.153 Because of restructuring aid received largely as a result of its acquisition of HBOS,154 Lloyds and RBS 
are required to divest a 5% market share to a new entrant, or small existing competitor in the market and achieve a 
£181 bn reduction of assets by 31 December 2014.155 
During mergers investigations in the banking sector, the Commission can request all relevant information from the 
national supervisory authorities. Thus, Member States may block a merger in order to protect a ‘legitimate interest’, 
such as financial stability in the domestic market, leaving some discretionary power to national supervision 
authorities. In contrast, the US DoJ cannot review a merger for systemic risk.156 However, competition authorities 
ought to be prudent when accepting the failing6firm6defence for under6performing, inefficient, and poorly managed 
firms.157 Otherwise, the TBTF doctrine becomes moral hazard. 
One cannot reflect on the above famous bailouts without formulating the following question: what did these banks 
have in common? The answer is a very fragile funding model supported by a risky loan portfolio and the fact that, in 
their rescue, the Commission did not come up with a pertinent ‘counterfactual’158 scenario of what would have 
happened if they had been allowed to fail. Fortis159 is yet another example of bank rescue due to excessive risk taking 
                                                          
145 Lyons 49. 
146 Ibid 51. 
147 European Central Bank (2006 and 2008), EU Banking Structures, Frankfurt am Main. 
148 See Stucke 318 who points at the post6merger consolidated assets of $751 billion and the US mega6merger, Travelers Group Inc and 
Citicorp; Markham 291 pinpointing that between 1980 and 1999, the number of commercial banks declined from 15000 to just 9000;  HA 
Shelanski, ‘Enforcing Competition During an Economic Crisis’ 77 Antitrust LJ (201062011) 238. 
149 MH Wolfson, ‘An Institutional Theory of Financial Crisis’ in Handbook (2013) 183. 
150 Akinbami (2013) 23. 
151 Prior to its takeover, HBOS was collapsing because of its high6risk lending practices and excessive use of leverage. Therefore, LBS’s takeover 
offer was conditional upon the receipt of a large amount of government aid necessary to rescue HBSO. See Marsden and Kokkoris 889. 
152 Figures are slightly contradicted by R Tomasic, ‘The failure of corporate governance and the limits of law: British banks and the global 
financial crisis’ in Sun, Stewart and Pollard (eds) 59, relying on the House of Commons Treasury Committee, ‘Banking Crisis: Dealing with the 
Failure of the UK Banks: Seventh Report of Session 2008609’, London, 519. Namely, £31.6 bn for Lloyds6TSB, £39.30 bn for HBOS, £47.1 bn 
for Barclays, £62.8 bn for RBS and £103.1 bn for HSBC. 
153 Vives 493. However, Lloyds was not allowed to take over Abbey in 2001. 
154 The UK gave notification of a restructuring plan for Lloyds Banking Group on 16 July 2009. 
155 Quigley 245; see also P Marsden and I Kokkoris, ‘The Role of Competition and State Aid Policy in Financial and Monetary Law’ 13 JIEL 
(2010) 3, 877. 
156 Stucke 322. 
157 See e.g. Marsden and Kokkoris 881. 
158 See also Lyons 54 on WestLB. 
159 On Fortis case, see e.g. J Pisani6Ferry and A Sapir, EU banking policies, Economic Policy, April 2010, 354. 
  Durham Law School                                     Draft article forthcoming vol 16 CYELS                     Anca D Chirita   
                
17 
 
as a result of its participation in the ABN AMRO merger.160 Competition authorities have been ill6equipped to assess 
the systemic risk and eroded the legitimacy of the TBTF doctrine of intervention as it has helped inefficient banks to 
remain ‘viable’ on the market.161 Even the Commission itself has practically realised its defective implementation 
since, more recently, it has called for a ‘sound’ restructuring plan for banks before capitalisations or taking any other 
asset protection measures.162 This new move follows early indications that the EU is going to ‘toughen’ its state aid to 
failing banks.163 Given such a huge social cost to society, the new approach comes late. The major criticism of the 
TBTF doctrine remains, however, it having been endorsed by EU policy6makers as a ‘way out’ of the crisis. 
 
VI. ON EMERGING ANTI COMPETITIVE PRACTICES RELATED TO THE TBTF DOCTRINE 
 
Most recent antitrust investigations have dealt with innovative and highly sophisticated financial contracts, such as 
securitization, credit default swaps (CDS) or repos. They have affected businesses and consumers at a micro 
economic level.164 It was estimated that as the world GDP was $65 trillion in 2007, the value of the companies listed 
in the world stock markets would reach $63 trillion, but the total value of financial derivatives was $596 trillion, that 
is, eight times the size of the real economy,165 with a growth rate of 32% per annum since 1990.166 
Securitization is a highly sophisticated process of pooling high risk debt assets from residential mortgage loans, car 
loans, credit cards and so on, which were sold to an SPV in return for securities.167 Put simply, this process makes 
sure that risks associated with loans are shifted away from the original lenders to investors. First, the originator (O) 
applies for a mortgage loan; then the SPV buys O’s mortgage to guarantee the remoteness of the cash flows in return 
for securities which are purchased by investors (I). The cash received from I pays O’s loan. Basically, any interest rate 
or currency risk associated with the pooling of such assets is hedged168 using a variety of credit swap transactions. 
Credit rating agencies169 have played a key role in boosting the attractiveness of such securitized assets by assigning a 
credit rating for securities issued via the SPV. Investors have been overly reliant on ratings. In collateral bonds, the 
default risk has also been insured through CDS, i.e. the client promises to pay the guarantor a fixed fee in exchange 
for the guarantee that if a bond defaults, the guarantor will redeem it. 
Credit default swaps are derivative contracts designed to transfer the risk of credit default on debt obligations.170 
CDS are used by investors as an investment vehicle to hedge assets against default risks and assess debtor’s 
creditworthiness. Previously, the Commission has issued guidance on how to calculate the pricing of capital injections 
to ‘rescue’ CDS.171 However, very recently, the Commission sent a statement of objections to 13 investment banks, 
                                                          
160 On unsustainable business models see e.g. Lyons 58. 
161 See also A Heimler and F Jenny, ‘The limitations of European Union control of state aid’ 28 Oxford Rev of Economic Policy 2 (2012) 358 
both of whom are critical on restructuring aid being offered to ‘inefficient firms to remain active in the market’. 
162 European Commission, IP/13/672, Brussels, 10 July 2013, ‘State aid: Commission adapts crisis rules for banks’. 
163  Bloomberg, J Brunsden and E Duarte, ‘EU to Toughen Creditor6Loss Rules at Failing Banks’ August, 8 July 2013, at 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/print/2013607608, where it is mentioned that the EU has spent €1.7 trillion on the basis of the TBTF 
doctrine. 
164 See the Commission’s ‘new’ mission: ‘Competition law should ensure that credit institutions and other financial service providers do not 
behave in a manner that hampers the efficient functioning of the internal market’, at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/sectors/financial_services/capital_markets.html 
165 Sun, Stewart and Pollard 9. 
166 T Clarke, ‘Corporate governance causes of the global financial crisis’ in Handbook (2012) 31. 
167 See also BJ Keys, TK Mukherjee, A Seru and V Vig, ‘Did Securitization Lead to Lax Screening? Evidence from Subprime Loans’ 125 
Quarterly J of Economics 1 (2010) 307; S Krishnan, ‘Securitization’ in Handbook (2012) 290. 
168 Hedge funds are collective investments with a wide range of objectives, strategies, styles, techniques and assets, normally open to selected 
institutions. 
169 For example, Standard & Poor’s, Moody’s and Fitch. 
170 See C Brummer, Soft Law and the Global Financial System: Rule Making in the 21st Century (Cambridge, CUP, 2012) 212: The protection buyer is 
entitled to receive from the protection seller the par value of the bond on which the contract was made should the third party borrower default 
on its payments. 
171 Source: Communication from the Commission on the application of State aid rules to support measures in favour of banks in the context of 
the financial crisis, OJ C 356/02 2011. The guarantee fee should be the sum of a basic fee of 40 points, a risk6based fee to the product of 40 
points and a risk metric composed using the following formula: the guarantee fee=40bp x (1+ (1/2 X A/B) + (1/2 X C/D)), where A is the 
beneficiary’s median five6year senior CDS spread; B is the median iTraxx Europe Senior Financials five6year index; C is the median five6year 
  Durham Law School                                     Draft article forthcoming vol 16 CYELS                     Anca D Chirita   
                
18 
 
which have acted as intermediaries in the market for credit derivatives.172 Another investigation into CDS targets the 
International Swaps and Derivatives Association involved in the over6the6counter (OTC) trading of derivatives.173 
Preliminary indications suggest that the association may have been involved in a coordinated effort of investment 
banks to ‘delay or prevent exchanges’ from entering the credit derivatives business. An excellent definition of 
derivatives is offered by Braithwaite.174 Derivatives are ‘bilateral contracts where the rights and obligations of the 
parties reference an underlying asset, benchmark, index or other variable’. The classic example is a CDS where A and 
B decide on a notional sum. A agrees to pay B a fixed interest rate on that sum (periodic payment) while B agrees to 
pay a variable rate in return. As a result, B, who has a variable rate income but a fixed rate debt, can swap income 
streams with counterparties.175  
Over%the%counter derivatives (OTC), estimated at $707 trillion, are the reason why Lehman Brothers collapsed.176 
The number of OCTs rose to nine times the world GDP in 2010.177 There are some 65 million derivative contracts 
which are privately negotiated and used, for example, to hedge interest rates and credit risk, minimise tax liabilities 
or speculate on currencies etc.178 Hedging implies a transfer of assets with the aim of generating better returns to a 
given level of risk.179 
A repo is a collaterized loan where the seller agrees to sell securities at a discount (haircut) to the buyer (lender).180 
Lenders are rich institutional investors, like pension funds and mutual funds, that need a liquid but relatively safe 
place to invest cash. Repo is a generic name for repurchase agreements and sell/buy6backs, namely, A sells an asset 
(usually fixed6income securities) to B at price X. A also commits itself to repurchase the asset from a third party, C, 
at price Y in the near future or on demand.181 In other words, in the event that A defaults, B can sell it to C to offset 
its loss. Despite being labelled as the sale and repurchase of securities, repo is economically a ‘secured deposit’ having 
as its purpose the borrowing and lending of cash. 
All of the above are characterized by an oligopoly pricing power, asymmetric information, and unequal bargaining 
power, which allowed banks to generate high profits. 182  The proliferation of these contractual instruments 
demonstrates the value of Minsky’s classification of ‘financial fragility’183 as (i) hedge finance which amounts to 
liability obligations to be paid with the net cash flows from routine transactions; (ii) speculative finance where cash 
reserves are insufficient and require borrowing funds or selling less6liquid assets; and (iii) Ponzi finance where there 
will never be enough cash to meet outstanding financial obligations.184 Due to a failure to obtain additional financing, 
Ponzi firms have had to sell their assets, which created Fisher’s ‘price deflation’185 for the firms’ assets. 
 
VII. ON THE LIBOR MANIPULATION SCANDAL: YET ANOTHER ANTI COMPETITIVE PRACTICE? 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
senior CDS spread of all Member States; D is the median five6year senior CDS spread of the MS granting the guarantees. In other words, the 
risk profile in recapitalisation state aid is measured through the media five6year senior debt CDS spread. 
172 European Commission, IP/13/630, Brussels, 1 July 2013. The 13 banks are Merrill Lynch, Barclays, Bear Stearns, Paribas, Citygroup, 
Credit Suisse, Deutsche Bank, Goldman Sachs, HSBC, Morgan, Morgan Stanley, RBS, UBS and ISDA. 
173 European Commission, IP/13/286, Brussels, 26 March 2013. 
174 JP Braithwaite, Standard Form Contracts as Transnational Law: Evidence from the Derivatives Markets, 75 MLR 5 (2012) 783. 
175 Ibid 784. 
176 Ibid 785, 789. Lehman Brothers is said to have been involved in over 2,000 derivatives transactions. Five firms dominate the European and 
American OTC derivatives market, see Scherer 14. 
177 GA Epstein and P Habbard, ‘Speculation and Sovereign Debt: An Insidious Interaction’ in Handbook (2013) 328. 
178 Ibid. 
179 P Lysandrou, ‘Hedge funds’ in Handbook (2012) 145. 
180 JS Taub, ‘What We Don’t Talk About When We Talk About Banking’ in Handbook (2013) 457. 
181 See European Commission, Directorate6General for Internal Policies, Policy Department Economic and Scientific Policy, Economic and 
Monetary Affairs, Note on Shadow Banking6Minimum Haircuts on Collateral, 2013, 56. 
182 Crotty 153. 
183 J Kregell, ‘Political Economy Approaches to Financial Crisis: Hyman Minsky’s Financial Fragility Hypothesis’ in Handbook (2013) 160. 
184 See Tymoigne 99. 
185 I Fisher, ‘The debt6deflation theory of great depressions’ 1 Econometrica 4 (1933) 337. 
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LIBOR is a reference index sponsored by the British Banking Association used to calculate short6term interest rates 
on a range of financial instruments in excess of $350 trillion, including CDS and complex derivatives.186 Its daily 
submission indicates what each bank estimates is their cost of unsecured borrowing from another bank. Competition 
authorities worldwide (EU, the UK, the US, Canada and Japan) alleged that the Contributor Panel Banks exchanged 
information to undervalue daily submissions and that brokers colluded to manipulate LIBOR to raise the profits from 
certain derivatives. In other words, under competitive conditions, banks would submit their valuation independently 
to move away from forms of artificial collusion. In the US USD LIBOR scandal,187 antitrust damage claims were 
rejected on the grounds of failure to prove conspiracy and restraint of trade, lack of antitrust standing and 
impossibility of recovery on the basis of the ‘indirect purchaser rule’.188 The US court ruled that there cannot be a 
damage recovery without showing that the actual loss stems from a reduction of competition or that any harm is the 
result of the defendant’s behaviour.189 This interpretation endorses the traditional approach to antitrust harm which 
requires proof of a resulting restriction of competition in the market for interbank loans. Since LIBOR displays only 
information about ‘prevailing rates’, the court went on to say that LIBOR quotations, even in the event that they 
were set artificially, did not correspond to the actual interest rate charged for interbank loans. This legal reasoning 
lacks a great deal of pragmatism since the authors of this innovative anticompetitive practice are banks which have 
unfortunately been excluded from antitrust scrutiny. This fact also justifies the court’s reservation. Semantically 
different from the economics of collusion, the manipulation of exchange rates is one of the means used to deceive the 
bank panel and implement fraud. 
Recent investigations have enquired whether the submitting banks intentionally undervalued LIBOR submissions, 
whether traders at banks and hedge funds tried to influence the rate to speculate on interest rate derivatives, and 
whether traders employed within Contributor Panel Banks received information about rates, either directly or 
through intermediaries, such as inter6dealer brokers. The heated question has turned to whether LIBOR should be 
assimilated into anticompetitive practices such as price6fixing and be criminalized as are cartels.190 Exchange rate 
manipulation has been unknown as an anticompetitive practice, while the banking sector has been practically 
excluded from any competition intervention against what is known as collusion by brokers/bank panels against 
consumers to fix the market price artificially. 
Another case involves Barclays,191 which submitted low Dollar LIBOR as a result of management instructions, 
which began in late August 2007. The Commission and the UK Financial Services Authority (FSA) investigated 
Barclays’ alleged infringements between traders and rate setters for the Euro Interbank Offer Rate (EURIBOR), such 
as manipulating energy prices in California between 2006 and 2008; mis6selling interest rate swaps to small 
businesses including fish and chip shops; and mis6selling payment protection insurance. Recently, the Financial 
Conduct Authority (formerly FSA) stated that Barclays, HSBC, RBS and Lloyds mis6sold insurance to small businesses 
as credit interest rate swaps. These products were marketed as low6cost protection against rising interest rates.192 In 
practice, information asymmetries between informed contract holders and ordinary investors are said to result in 
price inefficiency,193 with clear evidence that the share prices of banks were artificially altered by the short selling of 
derivatives. Specifically, a manipulator sells the shares of a company short and then spreads negative rumours about 
the company’s prospects.194 This has led to calls for another European proposal introducing bans on naked short 
                                                          
186 Source: CNN MONEY, A Petroff, Libor moving to NYSE Euronext at 
http:money.cnn.com/2013/07/09/investing/libor6nyse6uk/index.html?section=money… accessed on July 13, 2013. See C Lim, ‘Libor, 
Strategy, and International Cartel Investigations’ JECLP (2013). 
187 See PDS Phillip and RP Girnys, ‘No Antitrust Injury in Libor Rate6Setting? –What Happened to Effects?’ Comp Policy Int (2012) 3. 
188 Established in Illinois Brick Co v Illinois 431 US 720 (1977).   
189 Following a ruling by Judge Naomi Reice Buchwald of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York. 
190 A Stephan, ‘Should Libor6Rigging be treated like Price Fixing?’ at 
http://competitionpolicy.wordpress.com/2012/07/11/should6libor6rigging6be6treated6like6price6fixing/; extremely interesting on crisis 
cartels A Stephan, ‘Price Fixing in Crisis: Implications of an Economic Downturn for Cartels and Enforcement’ 35 World Comp (2012) 3, 511. 
191 It is UK’s most complained about bank with nearly 12,000 complaints in last six months of 2011 according to the Financial Ombudsman 
Service. 
192 Source: The Guardian http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/2013/feb/05/barclays616billion6mis6selling6compensation6bill. 
193 B Clarke, ‘Where was the ‘market for corporate control’ when we needed it?’ in Sun, Stewart and Pollard (eds) 77. 
194 Ibid 78. 
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selling if the price of a financial instrument falls by a significant amount in a single day.195 
The above recent investigations and the determination of antitrust enforcers and policy makers196 to deal with the 
complex and sophisticated financial anti6competitive practices are other indications that the TBTF197 doctrine is being 
constantly eroded.198 
 
VIII. END OF STORY: END OF CRISIS? 
  
Finally, it is not possible to understand the dimension of the current crisis without a proper critique of the role 
neoliberalism has played. Neoliberalism has probably been mostly under6estimated. It is known that neoliberalism 
called for the deregulation of financial markets199 in the first instance and for a weak state.200 Neoliberalism departs 
fundamentally from ordoliberal ideas of individual freedom as coerced by the state, or as Bonefeld put it,201 this 
‘ordered freedom’ positions itself somewhere between collectivism and laissez%faire liberalism, as a true guardian of 
markets. As the ordoliberal ideology emerged from attempts to address the problems created by the economic crisis 
in the 1920s, it has led to a different model of liberal governance, which is generally distrustful of markets. In other 
words, ordoliberalism was originally packaged as a hybrid product which has prided itself on being sympathetic (a 
‘humane’ economy)202 to the sociological effects of industrialisation and market competition on workers. However, 
Rüstow seems, partially, to contradict the human economy at least for ‘unionised workers’ who threaten the ‘weak’ 
state.203 His ideas hold water as regards pressure groups, such as lobbyists, monopolists or even oligopolists. For 
Eucken, in contrast, the ‘well6being of capitalism’ is almost synonymous with being competitive, risk6taking and self6
responsible.204 In other words, it is inconceivable that where the entrepreneurial spirit fails in practice, society should 
take on the responsibility for such a failure. This is precisely the rather hidden message of the ‘social market 
economy’ according to Bonefeld, 205  namely, a social policy that ensures that individuals act as self6responsible 
entrepreneurs. Applied to our crisis scenario, the big players of speculative games will have to agree to demonstrate 
social and corporate responsibility if, as Vanberg put it,206 such players ‘systematically’ perform poorly. 
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However, for Röpke, the challenge of capitalism lies in the measure of state intervention, i.e. a ‘crisis of 
interventionism’.207 This is also true for the EU crisis. Academics seem to agree more and more on one vital point: 
the real disaster did not happen because banks started to fail, but because the EU and national states rescued precisely 
those national champions of poor performance and, in the case of toxic assets, of fraud. 
The final question after the assessment of law in action and neoliberal policy, as has been implemented in real life, 
is to challenge the ideological foundations of neoliberalism as a model of social and economic governance. It is 
recognised that no social change can take place without shaking the economic ideology and the politics underpinning 
such ideology. Neoliberalism has been portrayed as ‘the ascendancy of financial capital over industrial capital in the 
pursuit of profit’.208 It has suffered generalised recessions (197465 and 1980682) with high unemployment, a collapse 
in investment, and high inflation, which has led to a long6term decline in profitability.209 As has previously been 
explained, because of the lost battle over the achievement of Keynesian ‘full employment’, this idealistic goal210 has 
had to surrender to more conservative and rather austere monetary policies to combat inflation. The lost battle also 
influenced policy makers to re6configure their focus on labour rigidities, market imperfections and distortions and, 
therefore, to call for competition as ‘a mechanism by which workers and units of capital are compelled to act’.211 As 
O’Connor suggested, ‘coercive’ competition replaced the ‘socialisation’ of economic activity by embedding at its 
foundation ideas of state rationalisation, market contestability and mobility. It is even more interesting to uncover 
how these three ingredients were implemented. Contestability of markets called for the prohibition of discrimination 
and eradication of market barriers to ensure a level playing field which would, in turn, guarantee labour mobility so 
as to enable capital to be relocated profitably elsewhere and to facilitate workers’ wage flexibility (low or cheaper 
labour).212 In contrast, the Keynesian idealistic vision was doomed to fail since it stands out for higher wages and 
extensive social protection.213 O’Connor uncovers the fact that neoliberalism re6established unemployment in the 
early 1980s so as to curb welfare benefits and collective bargaining agreements which was followed by the complete 
liberalisation of capital markets.214 Capital mobility is also said to constrain governments to pay ‘the going world rate’ 
to finance their fiscal deficits, to increase the bargaining power of capital owners, and to put upward pressure on the 
exchange rate and domestic taxation since governments must adjust to foreign tax policy requirements.215 Ultimately, 
due to fierce competition among capital owners, ‘financialization’ pushes down credit rates and risk premiums.216 
Others argued that financialization contributed to a sluggish overall performance based on consumption and export6
oriented growth models.217  
Thus, it comes as no great surprise that the re6configuration of influence, as is envisaged by neoliberalism, has 
essentially led to a weakening of the social and economic position of labour. Perhaps, one of the most pervasive and 
destructive drivers of this ‘new’ capitalism lies primarily in its ambition to achieve the financialization of the emerging 
global order, much of which has actually happened. This architectural configuration seems even more plausible since 
the idea of economic integration has been the fundamental principle of an internal market: where individuals’ 
migration is achieved through free movement, and mobility has served this purpose as a cheaper source of labour 
which boosts capital profits through workers’ flexibility; the free movement of capital has achieved financialization 
and the free movement of goods has succeeded in opening up markets through active competition.  
Under Article 119 TFEU, the idea of ‘free competition’ disguises the neoliberal idea of ‘coercive competition’ 
rather than of ‘ordered freedom’ since its macroeconomic foundations, which endorse explicitly an efficient use of 
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Union resources by its Member States, bear much of the neoliberal austerity imprint in the convergence criteria 
rather than the ‘human’ ordoliberal ideology previously formulated. This is also revealed by another position 
supported by German neoliberalism218 which argued that monetary policy should ‘complement’ monopoly policy to 
maintain the rule of law established by the ordoliberal concept of ‘ordered’ constitutional freedom. Thus, on the one 
hand, at a microeconomic level, this ‘order’ will safeguard individual economic rights, such as free enterprise or the 
freedom of contract, except when this promotes monopolies and, on the other hand, at a macroeconomic level, the 
rule of law will safeguard price stability, output, the distribution of income and the allocation of resources. Since the 
breakdown of Bretton Woods, the ‘macroeconomics trilemma’ 219  of open markets with free competition has 
favoured floating exchange rates without capital control to the detriment of other objectives of monetary policy.220 
While the architectural representations of coercive freedom have not been entirely in the negative in terms of 
achieved impact on the economy and society as a whole 6 for example, one cannot deny certain positive benefits of 
free movement of EU citizens221 6 the Achilles heel of the above freedoms is currently financialization being used as a 
means to misappropriate the human capital to uncover corporate responsibility for speculative pursuits.222 The social 
costs of this full6blown financial crisis have shown that the speculative gains of this kind have not been short6
termism.223 Rather, those in pursuit of speculation of profits have embraced in the long run the mature cost of a 
financial servicing industry which was even highly respected as a successful driver of capitalism until its ‘Big Fail’ 
finally spread across the globe. 
In conclusion, the ‘remaking’ of capitalism would not have been possible without deregulation and competitive 
pressure. 224  As government spending was assumed to be inflationary, spending has remained static, 225  whereas 
taxation has served to increase reliance on consumption taxes, such as VAT and payroll taxes and to diminish 
corporate tax.226 
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